Seminar "Off with their heads: the tragic double temptation of severe but rare punishment" by Prof. Kalle Parvinen (University of Turku)

Speaker
Prof. Kalle Parvinen, Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Turku, Finland

Title
Off with their heads: the tragic double temptation of severe but rare punishment

Abstract
We investigate a theoretical framework of crime and punishment. Authorities choose punishment frequency and severity under budgetary or strategic constraints. Individuals decide whether to commit crimes based on expected payoffs and imitate others based on observed outcomes. Costs of detection and punishment are explicitly modeled.
Our model demonstrates the “Gordon Gekko Effect,” named after the fictional corporate raider in Oliver Stone’s 1987 film Wall Street. In the movie, Gordon Gekko—played by Michael Douglas—embodies an aggressive, rule-breaking pursuit of profit, summed up in his iconic line, “Greed, for lack of a better word, is good.” Although the film concludes with Gekko’s downfall, arrest, and prolonged incarceration, most of the narrative depicts him enjoying wealth, influence, and a glamorous lifestyle. Misconduct that is infrequently punished yet visibly associated with short-term rewards may become a tempting option.
Institutions face temptations too. “Off with their heads!” commands the Queen of Hearts in Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (Carroll, 1865). Her decrees are spectacularly severe but, as Alice soon notices, rarely enforced. Once this becomes apparent, the Queen’s authority unravels. This comic vignette illustrates a real-world institutional temptation arising from cost minimization: detection and enforcement are resource-intensive, whereas increasing the statutory severity of punishment can be implemented at relatively low administrative cost.
In our model, we identify parameter regions in which severe-but-rare punishment minimizes institutional costs and simultaneously maximizes imitation of undesirable behavior. Such infrequent enforcement can allow costly behaviors to persist even when they are unprofitable on average: Even when the expected private payoff is negative, observed winners drive imitation.
In collaboration with Xinying Jia and Ulf Dieckmann

Biosketch
Dr. Parvinen studied applied mathematics at the University of Turku, Finland, where he completed his master's degree in 1997. He completed his doctoral thesis entitled "Adaptive Metapopulation Dynamics" and received his PhD degree in June 2001. He obtained his habilitation (docent, adjunct professor) in biomathematics in February 2006. In 2012, he completed pedagogical studies for university teachers. He is a permanent university researcher in applied mathematics at the University of Turku. Dr. Parvinen's fields of interest are metapopulations, especially structured metapopulation models, evolution of dispersal and cooperation, and the general theory of adaptive dynamics, including evolutionary suicide and function-valued traits.

Zoom Info

https://oist.zoom.us/j/99624730604?pwd=kIC7wMZwpFT95fOVtkTZVqXFSsWepa.1

Meeting ID: 996 2473 0604
Passcode: 123055