Seminar "Optimal Distancing Strategies and Incentives in the Absence of Effective Vaccines" by Mr. WooJoong Kim

Speaker: Mr. WooJoong Kim

Title: Optimal Distancing Strategies and Incentives in the Absence of Effective Vaccines

Affiliation: Department of Physics, Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology (UNIST), Ulsan, Republic of Korea

Hosted by Dieckmann Unit

Venue: L4E01, Lab 4

*Zoom is available: https://oist.zoom.us/j/93583000718?pwd=iRgWdqoenZG9FozTH3j2tWxxogwJim.1 

Abstract:

During the early stages of COVID-19, distancing strategies to alleviate the burden on healthcare systems before the development of vaccines received significant attention. Many existing studies on optimal distancing strategies assumed that a vaccine would be developed at a specific point and neglected or partially considered post-vaccine costs. However, such assumptions inherently depend on the timing of vaccine distribution, which is unpredictable, and the high mutation rate of RNA viruses like SARS-CoV-2 suggests that the absence of effective vaccines could persist longer than anticipated. In this context, this study explores an optimal distancing strategy for the long-term absence of effective vaccines using Pontryagin's minimum principle. Additionally, it examines the optimal incentive to align population behavior with public health goals through the mean-field game framework. Our findings show that there is an upper bound for necessary incentives, corresponding to the cost incurred when 7.6% of the population becomes infected, independent of the basic reproduction number and the effectiveness of distancing. We also found that the population's self-interests diverge from the social optimum not only when the utility of distancing is marginal but also maximal. While the former requires positive incentives, the latter requires negative incentives or penalties due to the lack of vaccine.

Biosketch:

Mr. WooJoong Kim is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Physics at the Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology (UNIST) in South Korea. His work focuses on applying mathematical and physical principles to address pressing societal challenges, particularly in public health. He has contributed to understanding optimal distancing strategies and incentive designs in the absence of effective vaccines, using advanced tools like Pontryagin's minimum principle and mean-field game theory. His research provides insights into managing public health strategies during prolonged pandemics, accounting for both social and individual behavioral dynamics.