# Integrated Information Theory (IIT)

- Starts from phenomenology, not from behavioral or neural correlates
- Identifies the essential properties of every experience (axioms)
- Derives the requirements that physical systems must satisfy to account for them (**postulates**)
- Has explanatory, predictive, and inferential power

Tononi 2004, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2015 Balduzzi and Tononi, 2008, 2009 Oizumi, Albantakis and Tononi, 2014 Tononi and Koch, 2015 Tononi, Boly, Massimini, Koch, 2016

# Integrated Information Theory (IIT)

### Phenomenology: axioms

Transcendental properties of consciousness (true of every experience)

### Physics: postulates

Required properties of its physical substrate (necessary and sufficient)







#### Phenomenal existence


### Physical existence

Experience





## Cause-effect power







## **Intrinsicality**




Integration



# **Composition**




**Exclusion** 




## **Information**




#### **Intrinsicality**




#### **Composition**




#### **Integration**



#### **Exclusion**




#### **Information**




# An experience is identical to a conceptual structure - a global maximum of irreducible, intrinsic cause-effect power

specified by a complex of elements in a state



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specified by a complex of elements in a state




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# From phenomenology to mechanisms, and back




## Explanatory power


Why not the cerebellum?




Why not efferent pathways?

Why not corticosubcortico-cortical loops?












Why not the cortex during deep sleep?




Why not the cortex during a seizure?






#### Explanatory power




from Pigorini et al., Neuroimage, 2015; Tononi et al., Nature Rev. Neurosci., 2016




# The more difficult the task, the higher the integrated information ( $\Phi^{max}$ ) and # of concepts) in the fittest animats



# Predictive power



# NCC: a within-state, no-task paradigm



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## Perceptual

## Thought-like

a.

Highly perceptual experiences	Highly thought-like experiences
A documentary about poor children somewhere in Eastern Europe	I was thinking about the possibility of having an erotic dream during this experiment, and that it would be very awkward.
I saw a TV commercial for a car.	I was thinking about the phrase: 'It pays to be wrong sometimes'.
I was watching a medieval play. A man and a woman were lying on the floor, pretending to be dead.	I was thinking about inviting someone to my house.

