

# ONE BODY

## FOUR TYPES OF MIND

### WHAT ARE MINDS?

Individual bodies that can monitor and regulate their bodily interactions with their environment following intrinsic normativity.


1. In such interactions **individuals can distinguish things in the environment and establish certain interactions with it according to a purpose** that emerges from the very constitution of the individual—a point of view.
2. **These interactions can err or succeed**, which amounts to external criteria to evaluate such interactions.

### DIFFERENT NORMS, DIFFERENT KINDS OF MIND

#### BIOLOGICAL MIND: LIFE

A **living creature** monitors and regulates its interactions with the environment where there are involved:


1. **A POINT OF VIEW (VALENCE)**: The agent seeks to maintain its identity as a living organism and **satisfy its biological needs** (predominantly metabolic needs).
2. **EXTERNAL NORMATIVE CRITERIA**: The conditions of success and failure of the interaction are established by the boundaries of viability of the organism, i.e., **health and sickness, and ultimately life and death** (Di Paolo, 2005).



#### SENSORIMOTOR MIND: ACTION

A living creature with **subsystems dedicated to perceive and act** coordinates itself with what the environment offers (O'Regan & Noë, 2001). This coordination is monitored and regulated by the agent according to:


1. **A POINT OF VIEW (AFFORDANCES)**: The agent **seeks to act and explore the possibilities of action** that its environment offers to the kind of body, esp., sensory and motor systems, it has.
2. **EXTERNAL NORMATIVE CRITERIA**: Other creatures in **development and evolutionary history**. A shared pattern of interaction that is sustained and modified in time.



#### INTERACTIVE MIND: OTHERS

A **living creature coordinates with another living creature**. Such coordination is monitored and regulated by both but is not completely subjected to any of the agent's purposes or points of view.


1. **TWO POINTS OF VIEW (JOINT ACTION)**: Agents **seek to interact with other living creatures to act together and recognize each other** as different points of view with purposes, needs, and concerns.
2. **EXTERNAL NORMATIVE CRITERIA**: The interaction generates a dynamics with "a life on its own" (Cuffari et al., 2015) so that **maintaining the interaction** is the criteria of correctness of each agent's actions.



#### SOCIAL MIND: REPRESENTATIONS

Human beings, and presumably other **social animals, establish patterns of interaction that repeat over time** and allow agents to engage in complex forms of coordination with others, e.g., joint action, (Di Paolo et al. 2018) and complex forms of activities, e.g., activities with abstract objects.

1. **A POINT OF VIEW (MEANING)**: Through repeated interaction with others, individuals become sensitive to possibilities of action and interaction in the environment. **Needs and possibilities unrelated to life maintenance or concrete interactions arise**, i.e., new attractors in agents' space of trajectories. Agents are thus able to approach the world in terms of representation. (Mojica & Gastelum-Vargas, 2021)
2. **EXTERNAL NORMATIVE CRITERIA**: Agents' actions are meaningful if they enter socially shared patterns of action, i.e., social practices. This means that **their actions are meaningful if they keep the agent belonging to a community where it can interact with others**. (Schatzki, 1996; Wittgenstein, 2009 [1953])



### DIFFERENT KINDS OF MIND, ONE BODY

### CONCLUSION

Keeping oneself alive and interacting with others/the environment are the primordial motivational forces for a living creature to establish cognitive interactions with the environment. Life (a living body) is the fundamental source of intrinsic purpose, i.e., a point of view, which is inherently self-preserving and directed to interact with what is not itself. More conceptual work is necessary to clarify the relation between these two tendencies.

### REFERENCES

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